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The appellant, LaDawn Prue ("Prue"), by and through her 
counsel, George M. Haley, of Haley & Stolebarger, and Jeffrey 
Weston Shields, hereby submits this Reply Brief of points and 
authorities in response to the Brief of Respondents (!fthe 
State11): 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prue responds to the factual statements in the State's Brief 
as follows: 
This appeal arises from the State's Motion for Summary 
Judgment before the Honorable Judith M. Billings. All facts must 
be taken in the light most favorable to Prue with all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, and all doubts resolved in her 
favor. Draper Bank & Trust Co. v. Lawson, 675 P.2d 1174 (Utah 
1983). Thus, if a factual dispute arises, the facts as set 
forth by Prue must control. This case has a great many disputed 
facts. Prue disputes the following factual statements in the 
State's Statement of Facts: paragraphs 2, 4, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 
26, 28, 29, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39. 
The following facts, plus the facts stated in Prue's initial 
Brief, are material, must be presumed true, and warrant a 
reversal of Judge Billings' Order granting, in part, the State's 
Motion for Summary Judgment: 
1. Kenneth Roberts ("Roberts") had a well-documented 
history of violence, escape and drug abuse. See Parts II, III 
and V(A) of Appellant's Brief. 
2. Kenneth Shulsen did not directly delegate to Leon Hatch 
the authority to transfer inmates. Shulsen deposition, p. 5, 
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l i ne s 9, 10; p. 8, l i nes 7 through 25; p . 10. 
3 . In December , 1 9 8 2 , i n o r d e r for an inmate to be 
t r ans fe r red to a halfway house, the recommendation of the Unit 
Management Team, the approva l of the Community C o r r e c t i o n s 
S c r e e n i n g C o m m i t t e e ( l fCCSC ! l) and t h e a p p r o v a l of t h e 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Review Board ("ARB") was r e q u i r e d . Danie l s 
depos i t ion , p . 26. 
4 . On December 10, 1982, the ARB voted to deny Roberts1 
t r ans f e r to a halfway house. Those o t h e r s in a t t e n d a n c e a l s o 
voted to deny Roberts1 t r a n s f e r . Barnhardt depos i t ion , p . 18. 
5. The CCSC d e n i e d R o b e r t s 1 r e q u e s t e d t r a n s f e r to a 
halfway house in Augus t , 1982 , r e f u s e d t o r e c o n s i d e r h i s 
t r a n s f e r , and was not consulted concerning Roberts1 t r ans fe r in 
December, 1982. Powers d e p o s i t i o n , p . 22; Mart in d e p o s i t i o n , 
p . 20. 
6. Leon Hatch a l t e r e d t h e t a l l y s h e e t of t he ARB! s 
December 10, 1982, meet ing from a d e n i a l to an approva l of 
R o b e r t s 1 t r a n s f e r because he b e l i e v e d h i s s u p e r i o r , William 
Mil l iken, wanted Roberts t rans fe r red to a halfway house before 
Christmas. Barnes criminal inves t iga t ion depos i t ion , pp. 17, 25, 
27. 
7. In August , 1982, the Board of Pardons ordered tha t 
Roberts be gradual ly phased in to s o c i e t y . I t was f o r e s e e a b l e 
t h a t Rober t s would a c t in a v i o l e n t , sexual manner i f he was 
unable to consummate h i s marriage with h i s wife and tha t i t was 
i m p e r a t i v e they undergo sex t h e r a p y . Rasmussen d e p o s i t i o n , 
p . 39, l i ne s 7 through 20; p . 50, l i ne s 8 through 17. 
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8. On December 22, 1982, Roberts was in medium security 
protective custody. On December 23, 1982, he was on the streets, 
unsupervised• 
The Utah State Corrections Annual Report, (Exhibit !fE,! of 
the Amicus Brief) states at page 63: 
From the moment of a felon's confinement following 
sentencing, the Board assumes statutory responsibility 
for deciding when and under what conditions that 
individual shall be released. 
At page 33, the Annual Report states: 
The mission of the Utah State Prison is to provide a 
continuum of confinement to control committed offenders 
so that they may function in a manner which will not be 
harmful to society, other offenders, or themselves. 
This Annual Report further recognizes the danger of directly 
removing an inmate from a totally isolated environment to one of 
total freedom. It states, at page 33: 
This philosophy presupposes that inmates who are 
gradually reintroduced to community life are much less 
likely to recidivate than are inmates abruptly released 
from high security levels. 
9. No arrangements had been made for Roberts to obtain sex 
therapy prior to his release. Rasmussen deposition, page 26, 
lines 13 through 15. 
10. The Ogden Community Corrections Center ("OCCC") did not 
allow married residents overnight leave until they had at least 
two or more days1 leave coming. Weekend Leave Policy, Addendum 
"A"; Martin deposition, p. 31. 
11. Roberts was not entitled to any overnight leave until 
he had been a resident of the OCCC for at least five weekends. 
Addendum ,fAl!; Martin deposition, pp. 32, 33. 
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12. Al l community c o r r e c t i o n s c e n t e r s (MCCCfsff) in the 
s t a t e of Utah required tha t before an inmate became enti tLed to 
l e a v e a halfway house , he f i l l out a l eave a p p l i c a t i o n form 
s e t t i n g f o r t h what he was going to do and where ( i n c l u d i n g 
a d d r e s s e s and phone numbers), when, and with whom he would be 
doing i t . R o b e r t s was no t r e q u i r e d t o f i l l ou t such an 
app l i ca t i on . Powers depos i t ion , p . 35; Martin depos i t ion , p . 37. 
13. Weldon Morgan had the duty to supervise Roberts once he 
was re leased from the halfway house. 
14. The 1985 Annual Report of the Utah Sta te Corrections 
Office s t a t e s , concerning CCC's: 
As i n m a t e s a p p r o a c h the t ime of t h e i r d e s i g n a t e d 
r e l e a s e s from p r i s o n , many a re p laced in community 
c o r r e c t i o n s c e n t e r s (CCC's) or halfway houses, even 
though s t i l l c l a s s i f i e d as i nma te s . This p e r i o d , 
a v e r a g i n g around four months, a l lows the inmate a 
phased r e - en t ry in to socie ty by r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g v i t a l 
l i n k s wi th family and acquaintances, finding employ-
ment, and gradual ly readjus t ing to freedom while s t i l l 
under g rea te r supervision than can be given by a parole 
agent . The success r a t e of inmates r e l e a s e d in t h i s 
way i s about twice t h a t of t hose r e l e a s e d d i r e c t l y 
from pr i son . ( I t should be mentioned tha t "lower r i s k " 
i n m a t e s a r e s e l e c t e d f o r CCC p l a c e m e n t . ) . . . 
Residents1 whereabouts are continuously monitored. 
15. Weldon Morgan did absolu te ly nothing to supervise or 
m o n i t o r R o b e r t s once he l e f t t h e ha l fway h o u s e . Morgan 
depos i t ion , p. 39. 
16. I t was f o r e s e e a b l e t h a t an i nma te wi th Robe r t s 1 
h i s t o r y would obtain and take drugs upon h i s r e l e a s e . 
17. I t i s reasonable to in fer from the foregoing tha t Leon 
Hatch and Weldon Morgan bypassed the e n t i r e r e l ea se p o l i c y and 
p r o c e d u r e of t h e Utah S t a t e P r i s o n and t h e D i v i s i o n of 
- /, _ 
Corrections in response to perceived pressure from their 
superior, William Milliken, to allow Roberts an unsupervised 
Christmas honeymoon with his wife. 
18. It is reasonable to infer from the foregoing that due 
to Roberts1 well-documented sexual impotency problem, he failed 
in his attempt to consummate his marriage with his wife; and, in 
frustration, he went out to find a woman to rape -- LaDawn Prue. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DOE V. ARGUELLES CONTROLS THE RESOLUTION OF 
THE INSTANT CASE. 
The State has extensively argued that this Court's unanimous 
opinion in Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985), is 
unsound. The State has argued this Court should adopt a 
definition of discretionary function that protects all State 
employees, regardless of their position in the government 
hierarchy, so long as their acts require some degree of 
discretion. This position ignores nearly 15 years of Utah 
precedent. 
In 1972, this Court rejected the State's position in the 
case of Carroll v. State Road Commission, 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 
1972) , observing that all acts of government employees require 
some degree of discretion, but only those decisions and acts that 
take place at the basic policy-making level are entitled to 
immunity; those which concern routine, everyday matters not 
requiring evaluation of broad policy factors, are not. With the 
exception of Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976), discussed 
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infra, this Court has consistently applied this test to govern-
mental immunity cases since 1972. This Court should not abandon 
such well-settled precedent. 
The State has mistakenly interpreted Doe v. Arguelles as 
support for its position that this Court should affirm Judge 
Billings1 ruling against William Milliken and Leon Hatch. In 
Doe, defendant Stromberg was the Youth Development Center's (YDC) 
equivalent of the Parole Board. Stromberg had the complete 
discretionary authority to release Arguelles from the YDC under 
whatever terms he deemed appropriate. He exercised his 
discretionary authority by creating release requirements that 
included professional counselling. This Court ruled that his 
failure to ensure such release requirements were carried out 
exposed Stromberg to liability. 
In the instant case, discretionary authority to release an 
inmate resides with the Parole Board. The acts of Leon Hatch and 
Weldon Morgan were outside the delegated parameters of their 
positions. The discretionary authority to determine which 
inmates should be released to halfway houses did not reside with 
Leon Hatch -- it resided with the ARB. The discretionary 
authority to determine whether or not an inmate should be 
released to a halfway house did not reside with Weldon Morgan --
it resided with the CCSC. Simply put, a State employee cannot 
exercise discretion which has not been delegated to him. 
As this Court stated in Doe v. Arguelles: 
A decision or action implementing a preexisting policy 
is operational in nature and is undeserving of 
protection under the discretionary function exception. 
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716 P.2d at 283 (Citations omitted). The Division of Corrections 
exercised its discretionary authority at the policy level by 
creating the ARB "for the express purpose of establishing 
uniformity, predictability and consistency, relative to all 
decisions, actions and recommendations made regarding inmates." 
The Medium Security Classification Procedures; Record on Appeal, 
at p. 708. 
The purpose of the ARB was to provide a uniform and informed 
decision-making process regarding inmate transfers that would 
consider the nature of the offense (Roberts was convicted of rape 
and armed robbery), escape potential (Roberts escaped in 1980 and 
had a long history of escape in his prior criminal history), and 
history of violence (Roberts had a long history of violence in 
and out of prison). 
Leon Hatch's changing the ARB's vote from denial to approval 
of Roberts1 transfer to the OCCC was not a discretionary 
function. 
The CCSC was created to provide deliberate and informed 
decisions concerning the transfer of inmates to halfway houses. 
At the CCSC meetings at which Roberts was considered, his 
prison "jacket" was available. The Committee members had 
available Merillee Rasmussen's psychological reports on Roberts, 
the Parole Board release requirements, Roberts1 institutional 
record documenting his stabbing an inmate with a screwdriver, 
barricading himself into his cell, and his use of amphetamines 
and hallucinogens, and other pertinent records. Morgan had none 
of this information available when he decided to bypass the CCSC 
and transport Roberts to the halfway house. Morgan's actions in 
this case cannot be considered as a discretionary function. 
These facts, viewed under the careful analysis provided by 
this Court in Doe v. Arguelles, warrant the reversal of Judge 
Billing's Order granting the State of Utah, William Milliken, 
Leon Hatch and Weldon Morgan's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
POINT II 
EPTING V. STATE IS NOT CONTROLLING IN THE 
INSTANT CASE. 
The State has cited Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 
1976), to support the argument that retained immunity for 
injuries arising out of incarceration, as found at Utah Code 
Ann. §63-30-10(10) (1953), bars Prue's claim. This Court decided 
Epting under a discretionary function analysis and did not decide 
the case on arising-out-of-incarceration grounds. Justice 
Crockett, writing for the majority and joined by Justices Ellett 
and Henriod, held: 
Accordingly, we agree with the view of the trial court 
that the handling of the prisoner Michael Hart was 
something which "arises out of the exercise of a 
discretionary function11 for which subsection (1) of 
Section 63-30-10 quoted above has retained sovereign 
immunity. 
546 P.2d at 244. The Court supported its ruling with a 
discussion of the various factors the prison personnel reviewed 
while deciding to put Michael Hart in the work release program. 
The State quotes from Epting, at page 28 of its Brief, in 
support of its arising-out-of-incarceration argument. However, 
the State left this clause out of their quotation: MWe therefore 
_ ft _ 
make this further comment: . . .if It is obvious that the 
language relied upon by the State in this case is dictum and, 
thus, not controlling here. 
This Court held in Doe v. Arguelles that under certain 
circumstances, the State may be responsible for inmates who have 
left their physical control. Although contrary to the Epting 
dictum quoted by the State, Doe is consistent with Justice 
Maughanfs dissent in Epting. 
Justice Maughan, joined by Justice Tuckett, vigorously 
dissented from the majority in Epting, stating, in part: 
. . . that a careful reading of the statute, and a 
consideration of the policy reasons behind enacting 
such a statute conclusively show that the statute's 
purpose is to prevent incarcerated persons from 
disrupting the orderly administration of governmental 
institutions where legal confinement, for crime of 
offense, is proper; by rendering nugatory frivolous 
lawsuits by incarcerated persons, against supervisory 
personnel. It has nothing whatever to do with a third 
party not even remotely connected with the incarcera-
tion. 
Id. , at 246. Justice Maughan cites Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 
2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 (1968), a case where an inmate who was 
stabbed by another inmate sued the State, as an example of the 
type of suit that the incarceration exception was intended to 
bar. 
Justice Maughanfs analysis was subsequently adopted by the 
majority in two later Utah Supreme Court cases which the State 
cites in support of its position in the instant appeal: Madsen 
v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978); and Schmitt v. Billings, 600 
P.2d 516 (Utah 1979). In both Madsen and Schmitt, this Court 
held that both actual incarceration and control were prerequi-
- Q -
sites to the application of the arising-out-of-incarceration 
exception, stating: 
The plain meaning of this section reflects a legisla-
tive intent to retain sovereign immunity for any injury 
occurring while the incarcerated person is in prison 
and under the control of the state. 
Madsen, 583 P.2d at 93; and Schmitt, 600 P.2d at 518 (emphasis 
added). 
This Court has always required a finding of actual 
incarceration before concluding that Utah Code Ann* §63-30-10(10) 
(1953) barred a plaintiff's claim. This Court has yet to rule 
upon the issue of whether or not ^63-30-10(10) would bar a claim 
arising outside the prison. Epting did not so hold and can have 
no stare decisis effect upon the facts of this case. 
The interpretation of the discretionary function exception 
provided by Epting v. State is inapplicable to the instant case. 
In Epting, the issue of failure to comply with established 
procedures as a negligent implementation of a discretionary 
function was not pled. Epting Complaint, Addendum "B". Further, 
the Epting Court's holding as to what constitutes a discretionary 
function is suspect. 
Prue asserts this Court has overruled Epting's interpreta-
tion of discretionary function sub silencio. Again, quoting from 
Justice Maughan's dissent in Epting: 
When we commend the work release program we commend a 
discretionary act taken at the planning level, the 
basic policy-making level. Here we are not concerned 
with decisions made on that level, we are concerned 
with circumstances occurring and decisions made on the 
operation level. This court has clearly made that 
distinction in Carroll v. State Road Commission. 
546 P.2d at 245. The majority in Epting did not decide the case 
on the basis of a planning-level versus operat ional - level 
analysis; however, this Court has utilized that distinction in 
every case interpreting discretionary function since Epting. 
The dissenting opinion written by Justice Maughan in Epting 
became the model for the discretionary function analysis utilized 
by this Court in every decision since Epting. It would be 
inappropriate for this Court to look to the Epting analysis in 
applying the discretionary function test to the facts of the 
instant case. This Court should rely upon its analysis set forth 
in its most recent cases -- Doe v. Arguelles, Point I, supra; and 
Little v. Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), 
Point III, infra. 
POINT III 
THE STATE OWED A CLEARLY DEFINED DUTY TO 
PROTECT PRUE AND THOSE SIMILARLY SITUATED 
FROM THE ACTS OF KENNETH ROBERTS. 
The State, by undertaking the responsibility to incarcerate 
violent offenders, has a duty to protect both the public at large 
and individual citizens who might foreseeably be harmed by said 
offenders. The acts of Roberts that caused Pruefs injuries were 
not only foreseeable, but expected. The State's employees' 
failure to act within the authority of their defined admini-
strative parameters and in furtherance of their duty to protect 
Prue from Roberts substantially contributed to Pruefs injuries. 
The State erroneously argues that it owed Prue no duty 
greater than that owed to the public at large, from which they 
- n -
conclude that she was owed no duty at all. This is not in accord 
with this Courtfs decisions. This Court's latest discussion upon 
the issue of duty is found in Beach v. University of Utah, 42 
Utah Adv.Rep. 30 (1986), wherein this Court held: 
The law imposes upon one party an affirmative duty to 
act only when certain special relationships exist 
between the parties. These relationships generally 
arise when one assumes responsibility for another's 
safety or deprives another of his or her normal 
opportunities for self-protection. The essence of a 
special relationship is dependence by one party upon 
the other or mutual dependence between the parties. 
Id., at 32; citations omitted; emphasis added. 
There is no question the State has assumed a special 
relationship of protecting the community and the individuals who 
make up that community. The State has imposed upon itself a duty 
to protect the general public. The Division of Corrections 
states the primary mission of corrections is community 
protection. The State's "public duty" analysis is defeated by 
its own publicly disseminated written statement setting forth 
this clear purpose. 
The Utah State Corrections Annual Report states: 
The primary mission of the Department of Corrections is 
community protection in a manner which also enhances 
the safety of staff and offenders. To accomplish this, 
Corrections is committed to the establishment of 
operational policies and procedures which provide for 
the development of security and offender programs and 
to identify, control and attempt to modify the inappro-
priate behavior of offenders. 
Utah State Corrections Annual Report 1985, p. VII; Appendix E to 
Amicus Curiae Brief. 
Utah Code Ann. §64-9a-3 (1953) allows release of inmates 
during reasonable hours for rehabilitation so long as it will not 
cause any undue risk to the public. Utah Code Ann. §64-9a-4(l) 
(1953) requires the Division to create written rules and 
regulations governing the release of inmates from CCCfs. This 
was done when the "leave policy11 and the "intake and orientation 
of residents policies" (Exhibits 1 and 2 of Prue's Brief on 
Appeal) were created. Utah Code Ann. §64-9a-4(3) (1953) gave 
Weldon Morgan the authority to arrest Roberts if he was not 
complying with the rules of the CCC's while on home leave. 
The State accepted the responsibility of keeping the 
public safe from Roberts and, by failing to follow its own 
policies and procedures, deprived the public of their "normal 
opportunities for sel f-protection", Beach, at 32, thereby 
establishing "the essence of a special relationship" which is 
"dependence by one party upon the other". Id. Once such a 
special relationship is established, "the law imposes upon 
one party"; i.e., the State respondents, "an affirmative duty to 
act." 
This Court, in Little v. Division of Family Services, 667 
P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), set out a three-step test for analyzing 
duty, negligence and proximate cause in an action against the 
State of Utah: 
1. Was there a factual connection between 
defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury? -- an issue 
of fact. 
2. Was the risk to which the plaintiff was 
subjected within the scope of the defendant's duty? 
Whether defendant's conduct was a substantial cause or 
factor in the harm suffered by plaintiff determines 
whether legal liability extends sufficiently to protect 
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t he p l a i n t i f f - - a q u e s t i o n of law. What was the 
standard required of defendant to avoid l i a b i l i t y ? The 
standard of care must be gauged by the duty imposed - -
a question of f ac t . 
3 . Was the s t anda rd of ca re breached? - - a 
quest ions of f ac t . 
667 P.2d at 53. 
The only legal issue available for resolution at this stage 
of the proceedings is: "Is the risk to which the plaintiff was 
subjected within the scope of defendant's duty?11 Id. The Court 
in Little defines that legal question as "whether the defendant's 
conduct was a substantial cause or factor in the harm suffered by 
the plaintiff." Id. The State's conduct in this case was a 
substantial cause of LaDawn Prue's injuries. 
There is no controlling Utah case law on the issue of duty 
in a correctional institution setting. As Judge Billings found 
in her Memorandum Decision at page 25, the better-reasoned cases 
follow the Restatement (Second) of Torts §319, which states: 
Duty of Those in Charge of Person Having Dangerous 
Propensities. One who takes charge of a third person 
whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause 
bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty 
to exercise reasonable care to control the third person 
to prevent him from doing harm. 
This Court recognized the Restatement of Torts as controlling 
authority in defining duty in Beach v. University of Utah, supra, 
and should continue to follow the Restatement analysis here. 
The basis for applying different standards under the 
"public duty" rule generally and the correctional release 
situation specifically is artfully discussed in Nelson, Victims' 
Suits Against Government Entities and Officials for Reckless 
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Release, 29 Am.U.L.Rev. 595, 614-15 (1980): 
By voluntarily assuming control over inmates, the 
government also assumes the obligation to control their 
behavior . . . 
The (public duty) rule, however, should not apply to 
the release of inmates from government detention 
facilities. The rule is generally used to deny claims 
against the government for failure to provide public 
services designed to benefit the community at large, 
such as police protection. The duty to control the 
conduct of another based on the relationship between 
the parties does not arise in cases involving the 
failure to provide services. When a victim is attacked 
by an assailant against whom police protection had been 
refused, there is no duty owed to the victim because 
there is no relationship between the police and the 
assailant. Furthermore, there is clearly no voluntary 
assumption of a duty by the police when they fail to 
provide protection to a citizen. In release situa-
tions, however, the government has voluntarily assumed 
the control of an inmate by placing him in a 
detentional facility. A duty to the victim arises out 
of this voluntary assumption of custodial responsi-
bility by the government. 
Citations omitted; emphasis added. 
One of the latest cases to speak directly on the issue of 
duty in a correctional setting is Division of Corrections 
v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986). In Neakok, the Alaska 
Court applied the "special relationship11 duty test to a negligent 
release situation similar to the instant case. In the course of 
a lengthy analysis of duty, the Court stated: 
The state's enhanced ability to observe the conditions 
under which a prisoner might be expected to be 
especially dangerous increases its potential ability to 
limit his dangerousness as a parolee. 
The state thus stands in a special relationship with 
the parolee, both because of its increased ability to 
foresee the dangers the parolee poses and because of 
its substantial ability to control the parolee. Given 
this special relationship, it is not unreasonable to 
impose a duty of care on the state to protect the 
victims of parolees. 
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721 P.2d at 1126-27. The Court concluded its analysis by 
stating: 
We therefore hold tha t s t a t e cor rec t ions personnel have 
the duty to use due care in supervising parolees and in 
p r o t e c t i n g the f o r e s e e a b l e v i c t i m s of parolees they 
know, or reasonably should know, to be dangerous. This 
d u t y r e q u i r e s t h a t such o f f i c i a l s t a k e whatever 
p r e c a u t i o n s t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n w i t h t h e i r 
knowledge and au thor i ty would take . We emphasize tha t 
the recogni t ion of the duty does not make the s t a t e 
l i a b l e for a l l harm caused by p a r o l e e s , but r a the r 
makes i t l i a b l e only when i t s negl igent supervision and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e i r p a r o l e causes the injury in 
quest ion. 
I d . , a t 1130, c i t i n g L i p a r i v . Sears Roebuck & Company, 497 
F.Supp. 185, 192 (D. Neb. 1980). 
Other S ta te Supreme Court decis ions discussing or adopting 
the s p e c i a l d u t y fo r c o r r e c t i o n a l r e l e a s e s i t u a t i o n s of 
Restatement of Torts (Second) §319 include: Cansler v. S ta te of 
Kansas , 234 Kan. 554, 675 P.2d 57 (1984); White v. S t a t e , 661 
P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983) ; Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons and 
P a r o l e s , 115 A r i z . 260 , 564 P.2d 1227 ( A r i z . 1977) ; S t a t e 
v . S i l v a , 86 Nev. 9 1 1 , 478 P .2d 591 ( 1 9 7 1 ) ; and Upchurch 
v . S t a t e , 51 Hawaii 150, 454 P.2d 112 (1969). 
The S t a t e r e l i e s p r i n c i p a l l y on t h r e e cases for support 
of i t s claims tha t there i s no duty on the par t of the Sta te to 
p ro tec t or not increase the r i s k to LaDawn Prue. Two of these , 
Obray v . Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160 (1971) , and 
C h r i s t e n s o n v . Hayward , 694 P .2d 612 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) , a r e 
d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e because t h e i r f a c t s a r e based upon a "pol ice 
duty" s e t t i n g r a the r than a cor rec t iona l s e t t i n g . As there was 
no v o l u n t a r y assumption of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , those cases have no 
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application here. In the third, Humann v. Wilson, 696 F.2d 783 
(10th Cir. 1983) , the claim was brought as a civil rights claim 
under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
confined its analysis to the issue of !fstate action" inherent in 
such federal claims, stating: 
. . . The crime was too remote from state action to 
constitute a valid civil rights claim. 
696 F.2d at 784; emphasis added. Contrary to defendants1 
argument, the Tenth Circuit specifically did not close the door 
on such actions by stating, ,fAnd again, we do not reach the 
immunity issue.!f 696 F.2d at 784. 
Prue!s injuries were a foreseeable result of the actions of 
Hatch and Morgan. Prior to Roberts1 release in December, 1982, 
Roberts had already escaped from the Utah State Hospital's sex 
offenders program, had violated the trust granted him by the 
Parole Board on at least two other occasions, and violated the 
terms of his parole by engaging in more sexual violence and 
violent crimes. 
In her reports, Merillee Rasraussen linked Roberts' impotency 
with his potential for violently "acting out11 if he failed in his 
attempts at sexual relations with his wife. Everyone involved in 
the decision to release Roberts recommended gradually phasing him 
into society linked with intensive therapy, monitoring, and close 
supervision to see how he reacted as he was given increased 
amounts of freedom. Warden Shulsen and the Division of 
Corrections own Annual Report recognized the foolishness of 
allowing an inmate to go directly from protective custody to 
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complete freedom. The Parole Board required therapy as a 
condition of parole because they thought it was needed and that 
it would do some good. They recommended gradually phasing 
Roberts into society because they thought it was important. 
Conversely, if no therapy was given and Roberts was released 
immediately, it was foreseeable that Roberts would act out 
aggressively in a violent sexual manner. 
The State owed a duty to LaDawn Prue. It negligently 
breached that duty and, as a result, she was shot: and paralyzed. 
Judge Billings' analysis of the duty issue is sound and should be 
affirmed by this Court. 
POINT IV 
EVEN IF THIS COURT WERE TO UTILIZE THE "VARIG 
TEST", AN APPLICATION OF THAT TEST TO THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE WARRANTS A REVERSAL OF 
JUDGE B I L L I N G S 1 RULING CONCERNING THE 
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION. 
The S t a t e c i t e s D a l e h i t e v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 346 U . S . 1 5 , 73 
S . C t . 9 5 6 , 9 7 L . E d . 1 4 2 7 ( 1 9 5 3 ) , a n d U n i t e d S t a t e s 
v . S .A. Empresa de V i a c a o Ae re a P.io G r a n d e n s e ( V a r i g A i r l i n e s ) , 
467 U . S . 7 9 7 , 104 S . C t . 2 7 5 5 , 81 L . E d . 2 d 260 ( 1 9 8 4 ) , a s s u p p o r t 
f o r t h e n o t i o n t h a t a c t i v i t i e s of s u b o r d i n a t e s a r e a l s o p r o t e c t e d 
b y t h e d i s c r e t i o n a r y f u n c t i o n e x c e p t i o n . P r u e s u b m i t s t h e 
f o l l o w i n g : 
1. It is contrary to the Utah case law which has 
interpreted and developed the discretionary function exception 
(as more fully set forth in Point I of this Brief, supra); and 
2. Even if this Court were to apply the "Varig test11 to 
the facts of this case, it still warrants a reversal of the Trial 
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Court's ruling concerning discretionary function immunity. 
Should this Court choose to diverge from the policy versus 
implementation analysis by applying the Varig or Dalehite tests, 
the outcome will remain the same. A subordinate does not have 
the power to act outside the parameters of his delegated 
authority. If the subordinate negligently does so, then he may 
be held liable for his actions. 
The State cites Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 
1977), in support of its position that "in the trenches" 
employees are entitled to discretionary immunity. However, the 
holding in Connell supports Prue's position that State employees 
can only exercise discretion within the parameters of their 
authority. In Connell, this Court held: 
On the other hand, if the employee's duties require no 
exercise of judgment or discretion, the reason for 
protecting his action does not exist. 
572 P.2d at 699. A subordinate cannot exercise judgment or 
discretion to disregard the decisions made by his/her 
superiors. 
The State c i t e s Dalehite v. United S t a t e s , supra, in support 
of i t s pos i t i on , as follows: 
The " d i s c r e t i o n a r y function" . . . includes more than 
i n i t i a t i o n of p rograms and a c t i v i t i e s . I t a l s o 
i nc ludes determinations made by executives or admini-
s t r a t o r s in e s t a b l i s h i n g p l a n s , s p e c i f i c a t i o n s or 
schedu les of o p e r a t i o n . Where t h e r e i s room for a 
pol icy judgment and dec is ion , there i s d i s c r e t i o n . 
346 U.S. a t 35-36 . The language quoted by the Sta te supports 
Prue ' s pos i t i on . In the in s t an t case , the establishment of the 
r e l e a s e p rocedures was d i s c r e t i o n a r y . Prue argues t h a t the 
failure to follow those procedures is not discretionary. 
The State has further quoted Dalehite as follows: 
It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in 
carrying out the operations of government in accordance 
with official directions cannot be actionable. 
Id., at 36. Logic dictates that acts of subordinates in carrying 
out operations of government contrary to official directions 
should be actionable. 
The State urges this Court to adopt a three-step "Varig" 
test to define particular conduct of a State employee as a 
''discretionary function", as follows: 
1. The acts in question are of a nature and quality the 
Legislature intended to protect from liability. 
Prue submits that the Legislature never intended to protect 
negligent employees who ignore written, established policies 
created by their superiors and then decide to bypass the system, 
resulting in injuries to citizens. 
2. The acts involve government regulation of private 
individuals. 
Prue agrees that they do. 
3. The implementation of policy and goal has been left to 
the discretion of a government agency. 
The implementation of the halfway house transfers policy was 
not left to the discretion of Leon Hatch and Weldon Morgan, but 
rather to the Warden, the ARB and the CCSC. The discretion in 
the implementation of the home leave policy was restricted by the 
parameters of the written guidelines. The negligent implementa-
tion of the policy by Hatch, Morgan and Milliken is actionable. 
Whether t h e Cour t u s e s t h e V a r i g A i r l i n e s t e s t , the 
m i n i s t e r i a l o p e r a t i o n a l t e s t , or t h e p o l i c y - l e v e l v e r s u s 
implementa t ion t e s t , the i n e s c a p a b l e conc lus ion i s t h a t the 
r e sponden t s 1 a c t i o n s a r e not p r o t e c t e d by immunity and t h a t 
LaDawn Prue i s e n t i t l e d to her day in cour t . 
For the foregoing reasons , LaDawn Prue urges t h i s Court to 
reverse the por t ion of Judge B i l l i ngs 1 ru l ing s t a t i n g t h a t the 
i n d i v i d u a l S t a t e defendants a r e immune from s u i t under the 
d i sc re t iona ry function exception. 
POINT V 
THE 1983 AMENDMENT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §63-30-4 
IS NOT RETROACTIVE. 
The State argues in its Brief that this Court should 
retroactively apply the 1983 amendment to Utah Code Ann. 563-30-4 
(1953) deleting gross negligence as a ground for suing a State 
employee. The State argues that since LaDawn Prue could not have 
filed her action until after the expiration of ninety days, her 
right to sue the individual State defendants did not vest until 
after the operative date of the legislation. 
The statute which was in effect at the time Prue's cause of 
action arose must apply. This is supported by both Utah 
statutory and case law. Utah Code Ann. $68-3-3 (1953) states: 
Revised statutes not retroactive. No part of these 
revised statutes is retroactive unless expressly 
so declared. 
Utah cases analyzing the application of statutes hold that 
an amendment to a statute cannot take away a vested right and 
that Courts must utilize the law as it exists at the time the 
- 91 -
cause of action arose. See Okland Construction Company 
v. Industrial Commission, 520 P.2d 208 (Utah 1974); State 
Department of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 
1982). 
The cases cited by the State apply only to remedial legisla-
tion. The amendment to §63-30-4 is not "remedial legislation11. 
If an individual sued a State employee in 1983 for gross 
negligence, the individual sued that employee outside the 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-1, et seq. 
(1953), and the Act has no application. Therefore, the 
individual would not have to comply with the notice requirement. 
Therefore, LaDawn Prue could have sued William Mil liken, Leon 
Hatch and Weldon Morgan on the 24th of December, 1982, and 
her rights to sue for gross negligence vested on that date. 
The State further argues that the individual State 
respondents have maintained their common law immunities. This is 
contrary to the plain language of §63-30-4, the holding of this 
Court in Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983), and 
§68-3-3. 
Any immunity a State employee retains in the exercise of 
his employment is confined within the parameters of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Section 63-30-4 states that a State 
employee has no protection for injuries caused by his gross 
negligence. Therefore, a grossly-negligent State employee does 
not carry with him any common law immunity. 
This Court should affirm Judge Billings1 ruling that the 
individual State defendants are liable to Prue for her injuries 
caused by their "gross negligence11. 
POINT VI 
SOUND PUBLIC POLICY AND JUSTICE MANDATE THAT 
THIS COURT RULE THAT LADAWN PRUE IS ENTITLED 
TO HER DAY IN COURT AGAINST LEON HATCH, 
WELDON MORGAN, WILLIAM MILLIKEN AND THE STATE 
OF UTAH FOR COMPENSATION FOR HER INJURIES. 
Under the guise of public policy, the State and the Amicus 
Brief request that this Court create a standard by which a 
subordinate state employee would be unanswerable to the public 
injured by the State's employees1 negligent actions. This is 
contrary to Utah law and is bad public policy. Sound public 
policy supports the notion that State employees must follow 
established rules. If an employee decides on his own not to 
follow the rules, then he is liable to suit. 
The policy versus implementation test is not a burden on the 
State and does not f,open the floodgates11. In fact, it affords 
the State an opportunity to minimize its risk of liability. If 
the State adopted coherent rules, regulations and criteria 
concerning the transfer of inmates to halfway houses and what 
steps corrections personnel should take in supervising an inmate, 
and then ensured those rules were followed, there would be no 
basis for the establishment of negligence and the State would be 
immune from suit. 
Prue agrees with the statement at pages 16 and 17 of 
the Amicus Brief: 
This Court should limit its dealings to law and legal 
principles, here, in the Prue v. State of Utah case, 
and leave the public policy issues to the legislative 
forum. 
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If the State of Utah is uncomfortable with the way the 
Governmental Immunity Act is written, then the State may lobby 
the Legislature for an amendment to the Act. This Court must not 
assume that responsibility. LaDawn Prue is entitled to her day 
in court and she respectfully requests that this Court provide 
her that opportunity. 
CONCLUSION 
Doe v. Arguelles is good law. Applying the Doe policy level 
versus implementation test, or any other test this Court wishes 
to utilize, to the facts of this case leads to the conclusion 
that the State respondents were not engaged in a discretionary 
function when they violated previously established procedures 
and allowed Roberts an ill-advised Christmas honeymoon with 
his wife. The State negligently breached its duty to LaDawn Prue 
in releasing and failing to supervise Roberts. As a direct, 
foreseeable and proximate result, LaDawn Prue was shot and 
paralyzed. 
Prue is entitled to her day in court against the State of 
Utah, together with William Milliken, Leon Hatch, and Weldon 
Morgan, both individually for gross negligence and in their 
representative capacities for simple negligence. 
Therefore, LaDawn Prue prays that this Court reverse Judge 
Billings1 Order dismissing Prue's Complaint against the State, 
Milliken, Hatch and Morgan in their representative capacities for 
their negligence, and affirm Judge Billings1 Order denying 
Milliken, Hatch and Morgan's Motion for Summary Judgment for 
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their gross negligence, award appellant's costs incurred in 
this appeal, and remand this case for trial. 
DATED this / / day of October, 1986. 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
feTDl^SHlELDS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
J ivs; 
WUE1QLU) LEAVE 
iMi 
Weekend leave will be taken in the period of time from Friday after 
work unti] 11:00 p.m. Sunday. (In the case of Monday holidays, i t can be 
extended one day.) 
leave i s not to be considered automatic, but must be earned. Nonnally, 
a resident will have no leave his first three weekends in the center. 
Assuming a resident has performed well, he may be permitted weekend leave 
as follows: 
Forth weekend: one day 
Fifth weekend: two days 
Sixth weekend: three days 
Married residents may have overnight leave when they have two or more 
days1 leave coming. Overnight leave will not normally be granted to single 
residents, but rare exceptions can be made where circumstances warrant. 
Justifiable circumstances include emergency situations, rewarding the 
resident for some outstanding service to the center, or rewarding him for 
excellent performance over a period of time. 
Residents will not be allowed to schedule leave activities together. 
My resident who is eligible and wants to go on weekend leave must 
fill out a leave application, putting down the activities tha*. he it tends 
to engage in, the places he will be going, the people he will be with the 
times, etc. These activities must be approved by his couiselor. The coun-
selor should confer with his resident and read the leave application care-
fully, making £ure that all stated activities are legitimntc and that there 
are no gaps of time or lacks of other pertinent information. A counselor may 
allow a resident the privilege of putting down two or three alternate places 
to be, such as home, girl friend's, etc., without having to state specific 
V/nnKEMD IEWE 
Page TVo 
times as long as a resident can be reached by phone at one of the alternate 
places. For any activity where a resident cannot bo reached by phonef spe-
cific times must be put down on the leave application. 
Tlic application rust he submitted in advance, in sufficient time for the 
counselor to structure the weekend leave activities no later than Thursday 
evening. If the application is not submitted in timcf the counselor may 
deny weekend leave privileges. 
The custody officer on weekend duty .may give permission for a resident 
to make minor changes in his leave, such as allowing him to go bowling in-
stead of going to a movie. Extensions of time or requests to leave the Ogden 
area may not he granted. 
A resident may be allowed to return to the center and leave again for 
such reasonable activities as changing clothes, netting meals, etc. Custody 
officers arc also to log any such return", noting carefully hew long a resi-
dent stays and any other information that may be nertinent, particularly if 
there are any suspicious circumstances. 
If a man loses a dayfs leave for an infraction he should lose an entire 
day; in other words, Saturday or Sunday. 
Special four-hour leave may be granted under compelling circumstances 
in rare instances when something unforseen occurs and tlie resident is sure 
his counselor will approve. The resident will ho held responsible i-f it 
develops his counselor docs not approve. This is not to be used as an ex-
cuse to leave the center to do soncthinft that could be structured and taken 
care of later: It is to be used rarely. 
Novewbcr 1, 1970 
Revised December 30, 1980 
ADDENDUM "B" 
Jackson Howard, fori 
Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
s 
THOMAS L. BPTING, II, and 
AMY LYNN EPTING, by and 
through their general s 
guardian, JAMES B. HANEGAN, 
Plaintiffs, : COMPLAINT 
vs* * 
STATE OF UTAH, l Civil No* 
Defendant* t 
Come now the plaintiffs and complain of the defendant and 
for cause of action, alleges 
1. The plaintiffs are minor children residing in Utah 
County, State of Utah, and appear in this action by their 
general guardian and Grandfather, James B* Hanegan* 
2. The defendant is a governmental entity* 
3* The plaintiffs filed a claim against the defendant 
pursuant to the Utah State Tort Claim Act on tha Sth day of 
December, 1974, and the defendant has failed to accept or 
deny the said claim and more than three months has expired 
since the filing of the claim* A copy of tha claim is 
attached, incorporated and made a part of this complaint* 
4. On or about the 10th day of October, 1974, Michael 
Bart was an inmate in the Utah State Penitentiary undar the 
control and custody of the warden of that penitentiary and 
his subordinate officers* 
5. Kichael Hart was Incarcerated as a result of a crime 
involving moral turpitude, to-witi arson, and by reason of 
the fact that he had a long history of violent criminal 
conduct, was known to the defendant, or should have been 
known to the defendant as being violent, malicious, incorrig-
ible and a sexual deviate. 
6. The criminal and dangerous propensities of the pri-
soner, Hart, were known to the defendant or, with the exercise 
of reasonable care, should have been known to the defendant 
and not withstanding this fact, the defendant, acting by and 
through its agents, officers and employees, allowed the 
prisoner to be released from custody without an order of 
the Court, without having served his sentence, and without 
having been rehabilitated? and in doing so, the defendant 
failed to exercise ordinary prudent control over the prisoner, 
thereby exposing the general public to the danger and risk 
attendant to such exposure. 
7. The care of prisoner Bart by the defendant was so 
flagrantly negligent that those charged with his custody and 
supervision allowed him to purchase alcoholic beverages, to 
drink them while in custody and to regulate the terms and 
conditions of his own incarceration to suit his (Hart's) con-
venience • 
8. On or about the 10th day of October, 1974, prisoner 
Hart failed to return to the prison and this fact was known 
to the defendant, its officers, agents, and employees as of 
9»30 p.m. on that date. 
9. It was known to the defendant, its officers, agents 
and employees that the prisoner was acquainted with one, 
Cynthia Hanegan Mitchell, the mother of the plaintiffs, and 
the defendant knew or should have known that the prisoner was 
a former resident of Orem and that in light of his acquaintance 
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with Cynthia Hanegan Mitchell and her husband, he was likely 
to seek out and find Cynthia Hanegan Mitchell and her husband, 
and notwithstanding the knowledge known to the defendant, its 
officers, agents and employees, the defendant failed and neg-
lected to inform Cynthia Hanegan Mitchell or her husband or 
relatives, or the Orem Police Department, of such escape and 
the defendant failed to exercise prudent, diligent and prompt 
efforts to apprehend the said prisoner after he had escaped 
and knowing the facts of the prisoner's propensities and his 
likely objectives and destinations, the defendant, nevertheless, 
did not act in a reasonable manner to apprehend the said prisoner 
10. The prisoner Hart, on or about the 10th day of October, 
1974, did batter, rape and murder Cynthia Hanegan Mitchell, 
the mother o( the plaintiffs. 
11, By reason of the negligence of the defendant, the 
plaintiffs have been deprived of the comfort, society, love 
and support of their mother all to their general damage in 
the amount of $1,000,000.00. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray judgment against the defendant 
as follows: 
1. For compensatory damages in the amount of $1,000,000.00. 
2. For costs of this action and such other relief as to 
the Court may seem just and proper in these premises. 
s/ Jackson Howard 
Jackson Howard, fori 
HOWARD, LEWIS t PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Plaintiffs' Addressi 
840 West 400 South 
Provo, Utah 84601 
•3-
CLAIM 
This Claim is made against the State of Utah by Thomas 
L. Epting and Amy Lynn Epting, acting by and through their 
general guardian, James R. Hanegan. This claim is founded 
upon the negligence of the State of Utah, its officers and 
agents, to-wit: the Warden of the Utah State Penitentiary 
and nis subordinates, in failing to guard and maintain cus-
tody of one, Michael Hart, a convicted felon with a known 
propensity for violence, ana, further, the said officers 
were negligent in failing to pursue the said escapee, and 
in failing to warn local residents, and in particular, under 
the circumstances in this case, in failing to warn the dece-
dent and her husband, Richard M. Mitcnell, that Michael Hart 
had escaped. As a result of the negligence of the officers 
and employees of the State in this regard, the said Michael 
Hart on tne day of October, 1974, escaped custody and 
thereafter in Utah County, State of Utah, assaulted and 
murdered Cynthia Epting Mitchell, the mother of your claimants, 
all to their general damage in the amount of $1,000,000*00, 
This claim is filed pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 30, 
of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended* 
Govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this &* day of , I/yfj^M.L^ . 19%g. 
\j;tXES R. K A 2 1 S G A K X ) 
Guardian of: 
Thomas L, Epting and Amy Lynn 
Epting 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: S3. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On the jl -~ day ols^WteuufL* # l*?/* personally ap-
peared before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of 
Utah, Janes R. Hanegan, the signer of the above instru-
meat, who duly acknowledged to xne that he executed the 
same. 
i r e s : jtmffarifi My Commission Exp  y^OTARY 
'/f/ljU/ Residing U ^ * * , H ^ 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief were mailed and/or 
hand-delivered on the // day of October, 1986, to the 
following parties: 
Allan Larson 
Bruce H. Jensen 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Carlie Christensen 
Assistant Attorney General 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
M. David Eckersley 
HOUPT & ECKERSLEY 
Attorneys for Defendant Felicia Roberts 
419 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
